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Abstract
Motivated by the highly-unionized public sectors, the high public shares in total em-
ployment, and the public sector wage premia observed in Europe, this paper examines
the importance of public sector unions for macroeconomic theory. The model gen-
erates cyclical behavior in hours and wages that is consistent with data behavior in
an economy with highly-unionized public sector, namely Germany during the period
1970-2007. The union model is a significant improvement over a model with exogenous
public employment. In addition, endogenously-determined public wage and hours add
to the distortionary effect of contractionary tax reforms by generating greater tax rate
changes, thus producing significantly higher welfare losses.
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1 Introduction
The behavior of the labor input is very important for output fluctuations, as Cooley and
Prescott (1995) and Kydland (1995) have pointed out.1 Despite this, real business cycle
(RBC) theory has been predominantly focused on the private sector and largely ignored the
dynamic general-equilibrium effects of public sector labor choice. This paper adds to earlier
research by distinguishing between the two types of hours and argues that the presence of
the public sector labor market in European economies generates significant interaction with
the private sector labor and capital markets. If public sector labor choice is ignored, then
important effects on cyclical fluctuations, as well as on welfare, due to fiscal regime changes,
will be missed.
Furthermore, several stylized facts suggest that this labor market is driven by non-competitive
arrangements: As reported in Table 1 on the next page, the public sectors in the major Eu-
ropean Union (EU) member states are highly unionized, and significantly more so than the
respective private sectors.2 Therefore, collective bargaining agreements are often used to
set public wage rates and employment levels in European economies. Central governments
in EU countries are the biggest employers at a national level, with a high public share in
total employment. The large share of public employees in total employment could in itself
constitute a source of union power, and could explain the positive public sector wage premia
over the private sector wages, which are observed in most post-WWII European economies
over the period 1970-2008. The Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) 2010 Final Report also
emphasizes that wage bargaining institutions are an important determinant of the wage dy-
namics and wage structure in the EU countries, and the major reason for the existence of
1In particular, changes in hours account for two-thirds of the movement in US output per person over
the business cycle.
2Even though the unionization rates for the EU countries in each sector were calculated in Visser (2003)
for only one year, the wide gap in union density between the two sectors indicates that the two labor markets
operate in different settings. High unionization rates alone do not necessarily translate into strong unions,
but the significance of unions in Europe can be inferred from the generally high coordination, centralization
and, in particular, the extensive coverage rate.
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the public wage premia.3
Table 1: Labor market facts 1970-2008
Private Public Coverage Average Average
Country sector union sector union rate publ./priv. publ./priv.
density density (2000) compensation employment
Euro Area (2001) 26 N/A 78 1.22 0.22
France (1993) 4 25 95 1.00 0.32
Germany (1997) 22 56 73 1.20 0.17
Italy (1997) 36 43 82 1.30 0.26
Spain (1997) 15 32 80 1.60 0.16
UK (2003) 18 59 36 1.08 0.27
US (2010) 7 35 15 1.08 0.16
Sources: BLS (2011), OECD (2011), Visser (2003)
Additionally, Lane (2003) shows that the public wage bill in OECD countries is pro-cyclical,
as opposed to government purchases, which are acyclical. Further empirical work from Lamo,
Perez and Schuknecht (2007, 2008) concludes that pro-cyclical discretionary fiscal policy can
have important effects on the economy through the unions. In particular, unions act as orga-
nized groups that constantly press for an expansion in the government wage bill. Therefore,
the presence of interest groups in the public sector imposes a significant constraint on the use
of fiscal policy in Europe as a tool for economic stabilization, and thus accentuates cyclical
fluctuations.
This paper uses the RBC framework for studying the cyclical properties of European public
sector labor markets.4 Most of the extensions to the benchmark RBC model, which allow for
public employment, however, model public sector labor market variables predominantly as
3Other reasons for the existence of a public sector wage premium, as documented in Ehrenberg and
Schwartz (1986) can be due to skill and experience differences: on average, public employees are older and
have higher qualification. In addition, females and employees belonging to a minority group receive higher
labor compensation compared to the remuneration package for similar duties in the private sector.
4In addition the baseline RBC model performance improves significantly when extended to capture spe-
cific features of the economy of interest.Some examples include: distortionary taxation (McGrattan 1994),
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exogenous, e.g. Finn (1998), Cavallo (2005), and Linnemann (2009). Those models feature
a representative household and two sectors - public and private - where labor hours can
be supplied. A serious shortcoming in these models is that wage rates in the economy are
identical, with public hours approximated by a stationary stochastic process. The absence
of an internal propagation mechanism for public employment is a serious limitation in this
class of models, particularly when the research focus falls on the interactions between the
two labor markets and their relation to the business cycle.
There are few RBC models with endogenous public sector wages and employment. Ardagna
(2007), for example, ex ante divides total population into capitalists and workers, with work-
ers being either employed in the private or public sector, or unemployed. In addition, both
sectors are unionized, and public sector wage is different from the private sector wage rate.
Public wage and employment are obtained from the government’s maximization problem,
where the government profit function is augmented with a term capturing equity consid-
erations. This is at odds with data, which shows that the biggest group of government
employees are bureaucrats. Another limitation of Ardagna’s (2007) setup is that it assigns
each household to a sector and by default excludes further labor reallocation, which is the
focus in this paper.
Additionally, there are even fewer RBC models that incorporate endogenously-determined
wage and hours in the public sector, and also reflect the importance of public sector union-
ization for the business cycles in EU countries. Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012)
were the first to develop a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with
public and private wages being determined in different environments. The private sector
wage is determined within a competitive market framework, while the public sector wage is
an optimal solution to the union’s optimization problem. In addition, the impulse response
analysis in Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012) generates pro-cyclical public wage and
hours. Another important finding is the positive co-movement between the two wage rates,
and public and private hours. These are all robust patterns have been observed previously
government spending (Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992), and productive public investment (Baxter and
King 1993).
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in the empirical work of Lamo, Perez and Schuknecht (2007, 2008) and Perez and Sanchez
(2010).
The model in this paper adopts the public sector union maximization problem from Fernandez-
de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012) and incorporates it into a RBC model with richer tax structure
and fiscal policy instruments, i.e. Finn (1998), to address new aspects of the economy. In
particular, the individual quantitative effect of union optimization can be assessed relative
to Finn’s (1998) setup with exogenous public hours and a single, competitive wage rate. In
addition, the fiscal policy instruments will be specified as the shares of government purchases
and investment in output, which allows the government to react to output. The presence of
a union in the public sector will thus crowd out the other types of the government spending
at the expense of the public sector wage bill, an effect not present in Fernandez-de-Cordoba
et al. (2009, 2012). Additionally, in contrast to Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012),
who model public employment as output-enhancing, public employment in this paper is a
wasteful expenditure from a productive point of view.5 Lastly, a government’s highly waste-
ful public wage bill spending is expected to amplify fluctuations in hours, as there will be no
direct substitutability/complementarity between private and public hours. In other words,
the allocative efficiency will decrease significantly, as a wasteful hour spent working in the
public sector receives a higher return relative to a productive hour of work in the private
sector.
The analysis in this paper is done at the country level, as taxation and government spending
decisions are still to a great extent country-specific for individual EU member states.6 This
approach differs from Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012), who analyze the Euro Area
as a whole. Germany is the preferred choice for calibration in this paper, as it is the classical
example of a large EU economy. Some of the features of the German economy include strong
public sector unions, and a large and growing gap between public and private sector union-
5This modeling choice is used to reflect the view that the public sector bureaucracy’s direct contribution
to the national product in the economy is somewhat small.
6Furthermore, based on their extensive compilation of case studies, Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000) and
Visser (2003) conclude that international unionism is weak, i.e. the influence of labor unions in Europe tends
to be constrained to the respective countries’s borders.
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ization, as reported in The Economist (2011). Additionally, Germany has a public sector
wage premium and public/private employment ratio similar to the EU average.
The study in this paper takes a much wider scope relative to Finn (1998) and at the same time
is complementary to Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012). It includes a complete eval-
uation of an RBC model with optimizing public sector union, following the widely-accepted
methodology in the RBC literature. The union model matches the cyclical fluctuations in
the public and private sector labor markets.7 Lastly, endogenously-determined public wage
and hours will be shown to add to the distortionary effect of contractionary tax reforms and
produce significantly higher welfare losses. The union model requires larger changes in tax
rates to achieve a pre-specified increase in tax revenue, as compared to Finn’s (1998) model
with exogenous public sector hours. Thus, endogenous public hours are quantitatively im-
portant for fiscal policy evaluation. Ignoring the interaction between hours and wages leads
to a significant underestimation of the welfare effect of tax regime changes.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model setup in the context of
the relevant literature. Sections 3 explains the data used and model calibration, and Section
4 solves for the steady-state. Section 5 presents the model solution procedure, discusses the
effects of different shocks and the impulse responses of variables across model. Section 6 sim-
ulates the competing models and evaluates their properties for the calibrations performed for
Germany. Section 7 computes the long-run welfare costs of exogenous tax regime changes,
both across models and across countries. Section 8 concludes.
2 Model setup
2.1 Description of the model:
There is a representative household, as well as a representative firm. The household owns
the private physical capital and labor, which it supplies to the firm. Hours supplied in the
7Additionally, the union also compares well against the empirical autocorrelation and cross-correlation
functions generated from an unrestricted Vector Auto Regression (VAR). These results are presented in a
technical appendix, which is available upon request.
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public sector are decided via a collective agreement between a union and the government.
The perfectly-competitive firm produces output using labor, private and public capital. The
government uses tax revenues from consumption expenditure, labor and capital income to
finance: (1) government consumption, (2) government investment, (3) government transfers,
and (4) the public wage bill. The wage rate and hours supplied in the public sector are
determined by a utility-maximizing public sector union, as in Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al.
(2009), subject to the government period budget constraint.
2.2 Households
There is an infinitely-lived representative household in the model economy, and no population
growth. The household maximizes the following expected utility function
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Cht , G
c
t , N
h
t ), (2.2.1)
where E0 is the expectation operator as of period 0; C
h
t , G
c
t and N
h
t are household’s con-
sumption, per household consumption of government services, and hours worked by the
household at time t, respectively. The parameter β is the discount factor, 0 < β < 1. The
instantaneous utility function U(., ., .) is increasing in each argument and satisfies the Inada
conditions. Following Finn (1998), the CRRA form for utility is:
U(Cht , Gt, N
h
t ) =
[(Cht + ωG
c
t)
ψ(1−Nht )(1−ψ)](1−α) − 1
1− α , (2.2.2)
where (α > 1). The parameter ψ is the weight of consumption in utility, 0 < ψ < 1, and
0 < 1−ψ < 1 is the weight in the utility function that the household puts on leisure. Govern-
ment consumption is a substitute to private consumption, and the degree of substitutability
is measured by ω, where 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1.
The household has an endowment of one unit of time in each period t, which is split between
work, Nht and leisure, L
h
t , so that
Nht + L
h
t = 1. (2.2.3)
The household can supply hours of work in the public sector, N ght , or in the private one,
Npht , with N
h
t = N
ph
t + N
gh
t . The wage rates per hour of work in private and public sector
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are denoted by wpt and w
g
t , respectively. The household chooses N
ph
t only; public hours will
be endogenously chosen by the government, so N ght will be taken by the household as given,
as in Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2012).
The representative household saves by investing in private capital Iht . As an owner of capital,
the household receives interest income rtK
ph
t from renting the capital to the firms; rt is the
return to private capital, and Kpht denotes private capital stock in the beginning of period
t. As in Finn (1998), the household receives capital depreciation allowance in the amount of
τ kδpKpht , where τ
k is the capital income tax rate and 0 < δp < 1 is the depreciation rate of
private physical capital.
Finally, the household owns all firms in the economy, and receives all profit (Πht ) in the
form of dividends. The household’s budget constraint is
(1 + τ c)Cht + I
h
t ≤ (1− τ l)[wptNpht + wgtN ght ] + (1− τ k)rtKpht + τ kδpKpht +Gtt + Πht , (2.2.4)
where τ c, τ l are the proportional tax rates on consumption and labor income, respectively,
and Gtt is the per household transfer from the government.
The household’s private physical capital evolves according to the following law of motion
Kpht+1 = I
h
t + (1− δp)Kpht . (2.2.5)
The representative household acts competitively by taking prices {wpt , rt}∞t=0, tax rates
{τ c, τ l, τ k}, policy variables {wgt , N ght , Gct , Git, Gtt}∞t=0 as given, and chooses allocations {Cht ,
Npht , I
h
t , K
ph
t+1}∞t=0 to maximize Equation (2.2.1) subject to Equations (2.2.2)-(2.2.5), and ini-
tial condition for private physical capital, Khp0 .
The optimality conditions from the household’s problem, together with the transversality
condition (TVC) for private physical capital, are as follows8
Ct:
[
(Cht + ωG
c
t)
ψ(1−Nht )(1−ψ)
]−α
ψ(Cht + ωG
c
t)
ψ−1(1−Nht )(1−ψ) = Λt(1 + τ c) (2.2.6)
8Detailed derivations are provided in a companion Technical Appendix (available upon request).
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Npt :
[
(Cht + ωG
c
t)
ψ(1−Nht )(1−ψ)
]−α
(1− ψ)
[
Cht + ωG
c
t
1−Nht
]ψ
= Λt(1− τ l)wpt (2.2.7)
Kpt+1: βEtΛt+1
[
(1− τ k)rt+1 + τ kδp + (1− δp)
]
= Λt (2.2.8)
TVC: lim
t→∞
βtΛtK
p
t+1 = 0, (2.2.9)
where Λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the household’s budget constraint. The household
equates marginal utility from consumption with the marginal cost imposed on its budget.
Private hours are chosen so that the disutility of an hour work in the private sector at the
margin equals the after-tax return to labor. Next, the Euler equation describes the optimal
capital accumulation rule. The last expression is the TVC, which guarantees that the model
equilibrium is well-defined by ruling out explosive solution paths.
2.3 Firms
Following Finn (1998), there is also a representative private firm in the model economy. It
produces a homogeneous final product using a production function that requires private and
public physical capital, Kpt , K
g
t respectively, and labor hours N
p
t . The production function
is as follows
Yt = At(N
p
t )
θ(Kpt )
1−θ(Kgt )
ν , (2.3.1)
where At measures the total factor productivity in period t; 0 < θ, (1 − θ) < 1 are the
productivity of labor and private physical capital, respectively. Parameter ν ≥ 0 measures
the degree of increasing returns to scale (IRS) that public capital has on output.
The representative firm acts competitively by taking prices {wpt , rt}∞t=0 as given. Accord-
ingly, Kpt , and N
p
t are chosen every period to maximize firm’s static aggregate profit,
Πt = At(N
p
t )
θ(Kpt )
1−θ(Kgt )
ν − rtKpt − wptNpt . (2.3.2)
In equilibrium, profit is zero. In addition, labor and capital receive their marginal products
wpt = θ
Yt
Npt
, (2.3.3)
rt = (1− θ) Yt
Kpt
. (2.3.4)
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2.4 Government budget constraint
The government purchases goods, Gct , invests in public capital G
i
t, distributes transfers G
t
t,
hires labor N gt , and sets the public sector wage rate w
g
t . Public capital evolves according to
the following law of motion
Kgt+1 = G
i
t + (1− δg)Kgt , (2.4.1)
where 0 < δg < 1 is the linear depreciation rate on government physical capital.
Total government expenditure, Gct + G
i
t + w
g
tN
g
t + G
t
t, is financed by levying proportional
taxes on consumption, capital and labor income. Thus, the government budget constraint is
Gct +G
i
t + w
g
tN
g
t +G
t
t = τ
cCt + τ
krtK
p
t − τ kδpKpt + τ l
[
wptN
p
t + w
g
tN
g
t
]
. (2.4.2)
Government takes market prices {wpt , rt}∞t=0 and allocations {Npt , Kpt } as given.
The following six policy instruments, {τ c, τ k, τ l, Gct
Yt
,
Git
Yt
,
Gtt
Yt
}, will be exogenously set. In
particular,
Gct
Yt
,
Git
Yt
will follow stochastic processes. Thus, public consumption and investment
will respond to both exogenous shocks and output. (Kgt+1 will be exogenously determined
as well, subject to the initial condition Kg0 and the law of motion for G
i
t.) Government
transfers-to-output ratio Gty ≡ Gtt
Yt
will be fixed,9but the level of public transfers will vary
with output. All three tax rates {τ c, τ k, τ l} will be kept constant. Finally, the pair {N gt , wgt }
will be determined as an optimal solution from a collective bargaining problem between the
government and a public sector union, which is described in the next subsection.
2.5 Government sector union objective function
In contrast to Finn’s (1998) model, which features a single wage rate wt and exogenous public
employment, modeled as an AR(1) process, here the two variables will be obtained as optimal
choices from an explicit objective function maximization, as in Fernandez-de-Cordoba et. al
9The fixed government transfers/output ratio is to be interpreted as an ”implied” one, as it will be set
so that the model matches the long-run wage and employment ratios, as it will be shown in the following
sections.
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(2012):
max
wgt ,N
g
t
[
(N gt )
ρ + η(wgt )
ρ
]1/ρ
, (2.5.1)
where η > 0 is the relative weight put on wages, and ρ is the parameter determining the
constant elasticity of substitution between wages and hours, 1
1−ρ . Hence, the pair {N gt , wgt }
solves (2.5.1) s.t (2.4.1)-(2.4.2) and the processes for the other policy instruments.10
The interaction between the public sector union and the government is as follows: the
wage bill in the public sector, modeled as a residual spending item that balances the budget
constraint in every period, is distributed between wages and hours according to the union
utility function (2.5.1) specified above. Additionally, government period budget constraint
serves the role of a labor demand function, which will be subject to shocks, resulting from in-
novations to total factor productivity and the fiscal shares.11 Now the problem in the public
sector is a standard representation used in union literature, where a labor union maximizes
utility, constrained by a stochastic labor demand curve. In addition to producing endoge-
nous public wage and public hours, this optimization problem generates a public sector wage
that features a positive premium over the private sector one. Therefore, at least part of this
premium can be justified by the gains from unionization in the public sector. In equilibrium,
a positive linear relation exists between the public wage rate and public sector hours (”a
contract curve”)
N gt = η
1
ρwgt . (2.5.2)
The contract curve defines the set of allocations {wgt , N gt }, generated as an outcome of the
collective bargaining between the government and the union. Since the union optimizes over
both the public wage and hours, the outcome is efficient. The solution pair is at the intersec-
tion point of the contract curve, and the labor demand curve (government budget constraint).
10The public sector union should be taken as an aggregation of smaller unions who operate at federal and
state/local levels, who maximize the same objective function over local government period budget constraint.
The coalition of workers is large at a regional level, and thus able to influence the public sector wage rate.
Still, local unions are small relative to the size of the economy, hence wp is taken as given. Nonetheless,
both wage rates will be determined within the system, so there will be some feedback effect from public to
private wage.
11The balanced budget assumption is thus important in the model setup. Since the wage bill is a residual,
if the wage rate is increased, then hours need to be decreased.
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Next, Eq. (2.5.2) is plugged back into (2.4.2) to obtain a solution for the public sector
wage:
wgt = η
− 1
2ρ
[
τ cCt + τ
krtK
p
t − τ kδpKt + τ lwptNpt −Gct −Gtt −Git
1− τ l
] 1
2
. (2.5.3)
Optimal public hours are obtained by substituting (18) into (17) to obtain
N gt = η
1
2ρ
[
τ cCt + τ
krtK
p
t − τ kδpKt + τ lwptNpt −Gct −Gtt −Git
1− τ l
] 1
2
. (2.5.4)
Both public sector wage and hours will be negatively related to government consumption
and investment, and positively related to tax revenue from consumption, capital income and
private sector labor income. Public hours and the wage rate are directly affected by fiscal
policy variables: a decrease in government consumption, for example, will have a direct
positive effect on both public hours and wages, and thus on the household’s income. Such
effect are empirically observed in Lano, Perez, and Schuknecht (2008). In the model, the
crowding-out effect of government spending will generate important differences from earlier
literature. This makes it relevant for the analysis of the impulse responses to fiscal shares
shocks and for the long-run welfare effects of fiscal policy. These effects will be discussed at
length in the following sections.
2.6 Stochastic processes for the policy variables
The exogenous stochastic variables are the total factor productivity At, and the policy in-
struments
Gct
Yt
,
Git
Yt
are assumed to follow AR(1) processes in logs, in particular
lnAt+1 = (1− ρa) lnA0 + ρa lnAt + at+1, (2.6.1)
where A0 = A > 0 is steady-state level of the total factor productivity process, 0 < ρa < 1 is
the first-order autoregressive persistence parameter and at ∼ iidN(0, σ2a) are random shocks
to the total factor productivity progress. Hence, the innovations at represent unexpected
changes in the total factor productivity process.
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The stochastic process for the government consumption/output share {Gct
Yt
} is
ln
(
Gct+1
Yt+1
)
= (1− ρc) ln
(
Gc0
Y0
)
+ ρc ln
(
Gct
Yt
)
+ ct+1, (2.6.2)
or
lnGcyt+1 = (1− ρc) lnGcy0 + ρc lnGcyt + ct+1, (2.6.3)
where
Gc0
Y0
> 0 is the steady-state public consumption/output ratio, 0 < ρc < 1 is the
first-order autoregressive persistence parameter and ct ∼ iidN(0, σ2c ) are random shocks to
government consumption/output share. the innovations ct represent unexpected changes in
government consumption/output share.
The stochastic process followed by the government investment/output share {Git
Yt
} is
ln
(
Git+1
Yt+1
)
= (1− ρi) ln
(
Gi0
Y0
)
+ ρi ln
(
Git
Yt
)
+ it+1, (2.6.4)
or
lnGiyt+1 = (1− ρi) lnGiy0 + ρi lnGiyt + it+1, (2.6.5)
where
Gi0
Y0
> 0 is the steady-state public investment/output ratio, 0 < ρi < 1 is the first-order
autoregressive persistence parameter and it ∼ iidN(0, σ2i ) are random shocks to government
investment/output share. the innovations it represent unexpected changes in government
investment/output share.
Additionally, in Finn (1998), public hours will also follow an AR(1) process:
lnN gt+1 = (1− ρn) lnN g0 + ρn lnN gt + nt+1, (2.6.6)
where N g0 = N
g > 0 is the steady-state public employment, 0 < ρn < 1 is the first-order
autoregressive persistence parameter and nt ∼ iidN(0, σ2n) are random shocks to government
employment. the innovations nt represent unexpected changes in government employment.
2.7 Decentralized competitive equilibrium
Given the fixed value of government transfers/output ratio Gty, the exogenous processes fol-
lowed by {At, Gcyt , Giyt }∞t=0, tax rates {τ c, τ l, τ k}, and initial conditions for the state variables
12
{A0, Gcy0 , Giy0 , Kph0 , Kg0}, a decentralized competitive equilibrium (DCE) is defined to be a se-
quence of allocations {Cht , Npht , N ght , Ipht , Kpht+1, Kgt+1} ∀h, and prices {rt, wpt , wgt }∞t=0 such that
(i) the representative household maximizes utility; (ii) the stand-in firm maximizes profit
every period; (iii) government objective function is maximized subject to the government
budget constraint being satisfied in each time period; (iv) all markets clear.
3 Data and model calibration
Both the model in this paper and Finn (1998) are calibrated for German data at annual
frequency. Both the data set and steady-state DCE relationships of the models will be
used to set the parameter values, in order to replicate certain features of the reference
economy. In German data, ng/np = 0.17, and wg/wp = 1.20. The weight on public wages,
η, as well as government transfers/output ratio gty will be set so that the steady-state wage
and employment ratios in the model match the corresponding data averages. The curvature
parameter of the union’s CES maximization function was set to a standard value, ρ = −1, as
in Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2010).12 The average effective tax rates in EU countries were
obtained from McDaniel’s (2009) dataset.13 Over the period studied, the German economy
is characterized by a low average capital income tax rate, τ k = 0.16, and a relatively high
labor income tax rate, τ l = 0.409. The labor share, θ = 0.71, was computed as the average
ratio of compensation of employees in total output. Private and public capital depreciation
rates, δp = 0.082 and δg = 0.037, respectively, were approximated from the EU Klems
Database as the average ratio of gross fixed capital formation and the corresponding value
of fixed capital stock (both in constant 1995 prices) over the 1970-2007. The discount rate
β = 0.973 was calibrated from the steady-state Euler equation. The parameter describing
the curvature of the household’s utility function was set to α = 2. As in Kydland (1995), the
weight on consumption, ψ = 0.296, was set equal to the average steady-state total hours of
work in data as a share of total hours available. Parameter value ω = 0.099, was calibrated
using the MRS and data averages. The public capital share value, ν = 0.0233, is set equal
12A robustness check on the curvature parameter was performed with ρ = [−5,−4,−3,−2,−0.5], which
did not produce any significant difference in the results obtained, as parameter η adjusted accordingly.
13McDaniel’s approach was preferred to the one used by Mendoza et al. (1984) and the subsequent updates
due to the more careful treatment of property and import taxes.
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to the average public investment/output ratio. Persistence and innovation volatility of the
stochastic processes, as well as the AR(1) process for public employment in Finn (1998),
were estimated using OLS.14 Table 2 below summarizes the model parameters for Germany.
Table 2: Model Parameters
Param. Value Definition Source
β 0.973 Discount factor Calibrated
θ 0.710 Labor income share Data average
δp 0.082 Depreciation rate on private capital Data average
δg 0.037 Depreciation rate on government capital Data average
α 2.000 Curvature parameter of the utility function Set
ψ 0.296 Weight on consumption in utility Set
ν 0.023 Degree of increasing returns to scale of public capital Set
ρ -1.000 Curvature parameter of the union’s maximization function Set
ω 0.099 Weight on government services in household’s consumption Calibrated
τ c 0.148 Effective tax rate on consumption Data average
τ k 0.160 Effective tax rate on capital income Data average
τ l 0.409 Effective tax rate on labor income Data average
A 1.000 Steady-state level of total factor productivity Set
ρa 0.943 AR(1) parameter total factor productivity Estimated
ρc 0.976 AR(1) parameter government consumption/output ratio Estimated
ρi 0.853 AR(1) parameter government investment/output ratio Estimated
ρn 0.915 AR(1) parameter government employment (Finn’s model) Estimated
σa 0.013 SD of total factor productivity innovation Estimated
σc 0.016 SD of government consumption/output share innovation Estimated
σi 0.023 SD of government investment/output share innovation Estimated
σn 0.016 SD of government employment innovation (Finn’s model) Estimated
14Total factor productivity parameters, ρa = 0.943 and σa = 0.013, were estimated using the logged and
linearly detrended Solow residual series, obtained from the model’s aggregate production function and data.
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4 Solving for the steady-state
Once model parameters were obtained, the unique steady-state of the system was computed
numerically for the Germany-calibrated model. Results are reported in Table 3 below.
Table 3: Data averages and long-run solution
Description GE Data Finn GE Union GE
c/y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.590 0.576 0.576
i/y Investment-to-output ratio 0.210 0.212 0.212
gc/y Gov’t consumption-to-output ratio 0.189 0.189 0.189
gi/y Gov’t investment-to-output ratio 0.023 0.023 0.023
gt/y Gov’t transfers-to-output ratio 0.170 0.047 0.047
kp/y Private capital-to-output ratio 2.350 2.350 2.350
kg/y Public capital-to-output ratio 0.630 0.630 0.630
wpnp/y Priv. labor share in output 0.710 0.710 0.710
wgng/y Public wage bill-to-output ratio 0.130 0.146 0.145
rkp/y Capital share in output 0.290 0.290 0.290
ng/np Public-private employment ratio 0.170 0.205 0.170
wg/wp Public-private employment ratio 1.200 1.000 1.200
np Private sector employment 0.253 0.210 0.211
ng Public sector employment 0.043 0.043 0.036
η Relative weight on public wage rate - N/A 31.63
r˜ After-tax net return to capital 0.036 0.028 0.028
Note that the public transfers share, gty, and the relative weight attached to public wages,
η are set so that the wage and hours ratios match the corresponding data averages.15 In
addition, the steady-state values for hours in data are approximated by splitting the average
hours, expressed as a share of total available hours of work, according to the average hours
15In this model, the implied η cannot be interpreted directly, but should rather be regarded as containing
a scaling factor, as ng and wg differ in magnitude (due to the normalization of the time endowment to unity).
Therefore, once this is accounted for, i.e. when η is normalized by wg/ng, the ”corrected” parameter, η¯,
equals 0.998 for Germany. In other words, wage rate and hours are equally-weighted in the generalized
Stone-Geary union utility function, as typically assumed in the trade union literature.
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ratio.16 In Finn (1998), public hours are set to match the corresponding data average.
Overall, the long-run solutions of both models are good approximations to the data av-
erages. The steady-state real after-tax real interest rate, net of depreciation, delivered by
the two models, i.e. r˜ = (1− τ k)(r− δp), is close to the average real interest rate on 10-year
bonds, which is taken as a proxy for the return to private physical capital in the model.
Both models capture the public wage bill share of GDP in Germany. Furthermore, public
sector labor income is also a significant share relative to capital in Germany.
Across models, several important differences can be noted: in steady-state, Finn (1998)
produces a slightly higher level of total hours and lower public sector wages, compared to
the model with the public sector union. This is due to the additional constraint imposed in
the union model on the steady-state public-private hours and wages ratio. Model dynamics
out of the steady-state are investigated in the following section.
5 Model solution and impulse responses
Since there is no closed-form general solution for the model in this paper, a typical approach
followed in the RBC literature is to log-linearize the stationary DCE equations around the
steady state, where xˆt = lnxt − lnx, and then solve the linearized version of the model.
The linearized DCE system can be represented in the form of first-order linear stochastic
difference equations as in King, Plosser and Rebello (1999):
AEt+1xˆt = Bxˆt + Ct (5.0.1)
where A,B,C are coefficient matrices, t is a matrix of innovations, and xˆt is the stacked vec-
tor of state (also called ’predetermined’) variables, sˆt =
[
aˆt gˆ
cy
t gˆ
iy
t kˆ
p
t kˆ
g
t
]′
, and control
variables, zˆt =
[
yˆt cˆt iˆt nˆt nˆ
p
t nˆ
g
t wˆ
p
t wˆ
g
t λˆt gˆ
c
t gˆ
i
t gˆ
t
t rˆwt rˆlt
]′
. Klein’s (2000)
generalized eigenvalue decomposition algorithm was used to solve the model.
16In this way hours/employment data averages are made comparable in magnitude with the corresponding
theoretical variables in the union model.
16
Using the model solution, the impulse response functions (IRFs) were computed to analyze
the transitional dynamics of model variables to a surprise innovation to either productiv-
ity, or government consumption. The effects of total factor productivity (TFP) and fiscal
shocks to the government purchases in a model with public sector union are different com-
pared to Finn (1998), particularly when the behavior of labor market variables and the labor
reallocation is given close scrutiny.17
5.1 The Effect of a positive productivity shock
Figure 1 shows the impact of a 1% surprise TFP innovation on the economy with public
sector union and Finn’s setup. The impulse responses are expressed in log-deviation from the
variables’ original steady-states in the model economy calibrated to annual German data.
There are two main channels through which the TFP shock affects the model economy. A
higher TFP increases output directly upon impact. This constitutes a positive wealth effect,
as there is a higher availability of final goods, which could be used for private and public
consumption, as well as investment. From the rules for the government spending, investment
and transfers in levels, a higher output translates into higher level of expenditure in each
of the three categories. In turn, there is also a feedback effect from government investment
to output through public capital, which comes with a one-period lag. This indirect effect is
quite small. Meanwhile, the positive TFP shock increases both the marginal product of cap-
ital and labor, hence the real interest rate (not pictured) and the private wage rate increase.
The household responds to the price signals and supplies more hours in the private sector,
as well as increasing investment. This increase is also driven from both the intertemporal
consumption smoothing and the intra-temporal substitution between private consumption
and leisure. In terms of the labor-leisure trade-off, the income effect (”work more”) produced
by the increase in the private wage dominates the substitution effect (”work less”). Further-
more, the increase of private hours expands output even further, and thus both output and
government spending categories increase more than the amount of the shock upon impact.
Over time, as private physical capital stock accumulates, marginal product of capital falls,
which decreases the incentive to invest. In the long-run, all variables return to their old
17IRFs for a public investment share shock are quantitatively small, and are thus not presented here.
Those are available upon request.
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steady-state values. Due to the highly-persistent TFP process, the effect of the shock is still
present after 50 periods.
An observational equivalence is noted in the responses of most of the model variables across
the two models. Public sector labor dynamics, however, is quite distinct: In Finn (1998),
public hours stay fixed at their steady-state, and public wage transition is identical to the
private wage one. In the model with collective bargaining, however, there is the additional
effect of an increase in productivity leading to an increase in income and consumption.
Higher income and consumption lead to larger tax revenue. The growth in government rev-
enue exceeds the increase in the fiscal spending instruments; therefore, the additional funds
available for the wage bill lead to an expansion in both public sector wage and hours. The
effect on total hours in Germany is very small.18 In addition, the model with collective bar-
gaining in this paper generates an interesting dynamics in the wage and hours ratio, which
is not present in Finn (1998). The two wage rates, as well as the two types of hours move
together, making the model consistent with the empirical evidence presented in Lamo, Perez
and Schuknecht (2007, 2008).
Overall, the endogenous public sector hours model shows an important difference in the
composition of household’s labor income with the public sector share increasing at the ex-
pense of private sector labor income. At aggregate level, however, this distributional effect
disperses, as output and consumption dynamics are identical across models. Another im-
portant observation to make is that the TFP shocks, being the main driving force in the
union model, induce pro-cyclical behavior in public wage and hours. In the German model
economy, the shock effects are smaller and variables reach their peak response much more
rapidly. This means the impulse effect wears off much faster but the transition period can
still take up to 100 years. This illustrates the important long-run effects of TFP shocks in
the labor markets, and particularly on the wages- and hours ratios.
18Still, the increase in hours is much greater in magnitude compared to the responses reported in Fernandez-
de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2010).
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses to a positive 1% productivity shock in Germany
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5.2 The effect of a negative government consumption share shock
The second scenario is an exogenous restrictive fiscal policy, which is an unexpected de-
crease in the government consumption/output ratio. The impulse response functions for
this scenario are reported in Figure 2. The results are similar to those obtained from a stan-
dard RBC model. The plots show that a negative government consumption shock partially
crowds-in private consumption, as public consumption is only an imperfect substitute for
private consumption from the household’s point of view. This creates a significant positive
welfare effect in the model economy as the decrease in the government consumption ratio
frees additional resources that could be directed to private use. The increase in consumption
at the expense of a drop in investment, triggers a decrease in private sector hours through the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. In other words, the increase
in consumption, resulting from the positive wealth effect, decreases the need to supply labor,
so the household enjoys more leisure. The decrease in labor input leads to a fall in output,
and an increase in the private wage. Since government expenditure categories follow output,
public consumption, investment, and government transfers (not presented) also fall. Over
time, all variables return to their old-steady states.
Those common responses are typical in the RBC literature but in the presence of a union
in the public sector, the fall in labor supply leads to a lower tax revenue, while the increase
in consumption increases the tax revenue. The other spending categories also decrease, thus
leaving more funds available for the public sector wage bill. The effect on public hours is
very pronounced, when total hours responses are compared across models. Furthermore,
the model with public sector union generates a realistic labor reallocation from private to
public sector meaning that in times of fiscal restraint, government jobs become more at-
tractive. In a model with exogenous public employment, public sector hours stay fixed at
their steady-state value and do not respond to fiscal shocks. The effect of a decrease in the
government consumption/output ratio in Finn (1998) leads to a significant underestimation
in total hours. Additionally, the model with public sector union could again address the
relative labor income share evolution, which is the product of the public-private wage and
employment ratios. The results in this subsection differ from those in Fernandez-de-Cordoba
et al. (2009, 2010) in important ways: The negative shock to the fiscal instruments
20
Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a negative 1% government consumption/output share shock
in Germany
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creates a substitution effect and leads to the crowding-in of the public wage bill. In other
words, even under a regime of fiscal tightening, public employment and the public wage are
increased, i.e. shocks to the government consumption share make public wage and hours
behave counter-cyclically.
6 Model simulation and goodness-of-fit evaluation
This section compares the theoretical second moments of the simulated data series with
their empirical counterparts, with special attention paid to the behavior of public sector
hours and wages. Table 4 on the next page summarizes the empirical and simulated business
cycle statistics for the two models calibrated for Germany.19
In the German data, relative consumption volatility exceeds one, as the available series does
not provide a breakdown into consumption of non-durables and consumption of durables.
Durable products behave like investment, and vary much more than non-durables, while
model consumption corresponds to non-durable consumption. Since a major force in all
the three models is consumption smoothing, as dictated by the Euler equation, both mod-
els under-predict consumption volatility and investment variability. Across models, private
sector employment and private wage also vary less compared to data. Total employment
in German data varies less than either private or public employment due to the smaller
variation in the number of self-employed individuals. It is evident from Table 5 that the
model with public sector union underestimates public wage volatility, but matches public
employment quite well. Finn’s model captures the volatility of public employment due to
the fact that it is modeled as an exogenous stochastic process to mimic public hours time
series behavior.
Both models capture the high contemporaneous correlations of main variables with out-
19Using the model solutions, shock series were added to produce simulated data series. The length of the
draws for the series of innovations was 138, and the simulation was replicated 1000 times. Natural logarithms
were taken, and then all series were run through the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter
equal to 100. The first 100 observations were then excluded, and the average standard deviation of each
variable and its correlation with output were estimated across the 1000 replications.
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Table 4: Business Cycle Statistics Germany, 1970-2007
GE Data Finn (1998) Public Sector Union
σ(y) 0.0154 0.0165 0.0165
σ(c)/σ(y) 1.11 0.56 [0.49,0.62] 0.56 [0.49,0.62]
σ(i)/σ(y) 3.57 2.30 [2.24,2.36] 2.30 [2.24,2.36]
σ(np)/σ(y) 1.05 0.45 [0.40,0.50] 0.45 [0.40,0.49]
σ(ng)/σ(y) 1.06 0.91 [0.69,1.13] 1.27 [0.98,1.56]
σ(n)/σ(y) 0.73 0.38 [0.33,0.43] 0.39 [0.38,0.40]
σ(wp)/σ(y) 1.16 0.63 [0.59,0.68] 0.63 [0.59,0.68]
σ(wg)/σ(y) 3.50 0.63 [0.59,0.68] 1.19 [0.92,1.47]
corr(c, y) 0.80 0.85 [0.79,0.92] 0.85 [0.79,0.92]
corr(i, y) 0.85 0.99 [0.98,0.99] 0.99 [0.98,0.99]
corr(np, y) 0.60 0.89 [0.84,0.93] 0.89 [0.85,0.94]
corr(ng, y) 0.11 -0.05 [-0.29,0.20] 0.19 [0.04,0.43]
corr(n, y) 0.60 0.84 [0.78,0.91] 0.97 [0.97,0.98]
corr(wp, y) 0.60 0.95 [0.92,0.97] 0.94 [0.93,0.97]
corr(wg, y) 0.35 0.95 [0.92,0.97] 0.19 [0.04,0.43]
corr(n, np) 0.92 0.90 [0.86,0.95] 0.88 [0.79,0.92]
corr(n, ng) 0.43 0.28 [0.06, 0.51] 0.27 [0.05,0.49]
corr(np, ng) 0.12 -0.15 [-0.38,0.08] -0.21 [-0.44,0.02]
corr(np, wp) 0.21 0.70 [0.59,0.81] 0.71 [0.61,0.81]
corr(ng, wg) -0.38 0.03 [-0.22,0.28] 1.00 [1.00,1.00]
corr(ng, wp) 0.20 0.03 [-0.22,0.28] 0.45 [0.26,0.64]
corr(np, wg) 0.34 0.70 [0.59,0.81] -0.21 [-0.44,0.02]
corr(wp, wg) 0.48 1.00 [1.00,1.00] 0.45 [0.26,0.65]
put relatively well. Moreover, public sector variables are also pro-cyclical, but not as much
as the models predict: Finn (1998) even predicts that public employment is countercycli-
cal. Nevertheless, the model with the public union captures the co-movement between labor
market variables , as well as their contemporaneous correlations with output quite well,
compared to the alternative. The German data, as well as the model with public sector
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union, provide some support to the ”private sector wage-leader” hypothesis: that public sec-
tor wages follows those in the private sector but only moderately so. The dimension where
the union model fails, however, is the correlation between public sector hours and wages:
in the German data, it is negative, while the union model predicts a perfect positive linear
relationship. The reason is that the empirical correlation can be interpreted as showing the
net effect of supply and demand factors, while the model models concentrates exclusively on
the supply-side forces. Next, the empirical correlation between wages also well-captured by
the model with collective bargaining. In other words, empirical public sector wage follows
the private sector wage to a much lesser degree. A failure of the model with public sector
union is the predicted negative correlation between the two types of hours.20 Furthermore, it
is a well-known fact (e.g. Prescott 1986, Hansen 1992) that the RBC model captures private
sector labor market dynamics only imperfectly.
Overall, the model with the public sector union captures the labor market dynamics in
Germany, addressing dimensions that were ignored in earlier RBC models. Thus, an opti-
mizing union in the public sector proves to be an important ingredient in RBC models when
studying European labor markets with strong public sector unions. To assess the welfare
cost of fiscal policy in the presence of public sector union, several fiscal experiments were
performed and are reported in the following section.
7 Welfare evaluation of fiscal regime changes
The goal of this section is to quantify the importance of endogenously-determined public
sector hours for fiscal policy, relative to Finn’s setup with exogenously-fixed public hours.
Additionally, the explicit welfare analysis complements earlier studies in Finn (1998) and
Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2009, 2012). To understand the adjustment mechanisms after
an exogenous change in fiscal policy, each tax rate in the two models is varied over the
[0, 1] interval. Since all three tax rates were exogenously-specified, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(1997) show that for a wide class of RBC models, and plausible values for model parameters,
20To a certain extent, this is an artifact of the way fiscal instruments were specified. The prediction of
the model along this dimension greatly improves if government consumption and investment follow AR(1)
processes in levels, and thus do not react to output.
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a unique long-run solution exists. When tax rates are plotted against tax revenues, Laffer
curves (Laffer 1974) appear: in both Finn and the public sector union model, an inverted
U-shape relationship is observed between labor and capital income tax rates and total tax
revenues. Thus, there are pairs of tax rates that generate the same level of tax revenue. In
general, increasing tax rates could lead to either an increase or a decrease in total tax revenue,
depending on which side of the Laffer curve the economy is situated. For the German model
economy, however, both setups place Germany on the left side of the labor and capital tax
Laffer curve, as seen in Figs. 3-4. Furthermore, a change in a tax rate affects the tax receipts
from other tax bases as well, by influencing steady-state allocations and prices. Therefore,
to gain an additional insight of the effect of fiscal policy in the steady state, total tax revenue
is broken down into individual tax revenues corresponding to the tax bases, and plotted as
a function of each individual tax rate in Figs. 3-5, for both the public union model and Finn.
The shape of the capital tax Laffer curve, for example, presents an interesting case: an
increase in τ k leads to a negligible marginal increase in total tax revenue, since total tax
revenue is essentially flat in the τ k ∈ [0, 0.5] range, and for τ k ∈ [0.5, 1] total revenue is
negatively related to capital income tax rate.21 The German economy features a low rate
of capital income taxation, τ k = 0.16, thus the economy is situated safely away from the
downward sloping segment of the Laffer curve. The reason for the flat Laffer curve is clearly
seen from the breakdown in individual tax revenues as a function of capital income tax rate:
All increases in capital income tax revenue are offset by corresponding decreases in labor
income and consumption tax revenue. Since τ c and τ l are held fixed while τ k is varied,
the fall in labor income and consumption tax revenue is entirely driven by the shrinking
tax bases. Across models, union framework features only slightly higher capital income and
consumption revenue, and lower labor income tax revenue for each τ k, as compared to Finn’s
setup.
On the other hand, labor income tax rate places Germany much closer to the peak of the
labor tax Laffer curve, but still far away from the downward-sloping segment. Thus, the
21Uhlig and Trabandt (2010) find a similarly-shaped capital tax Laffer curve in an RBC model without
public employment, calibrated to the EU-15 data.
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government could increase tax revenue by increasing τ l. The computed total tax revenue-
maximizing τ l is approximately 50% in the union model, and 55% in Finn. As demonstrated
in Fig. 4, the difference in computed total tax revenue with respect to labor income tax
in the union model and Finn is due to the difference in the steady-state public and private
hours, as well as the wage rates in the two models: Finn’s model, featuring a single wage
rate and fixed public employment, generates both a higher total tax revenue and a higher
labor income tax revenue Laffer curve, as compared to the union model.
Lastly, for the consumption tax rate, no Laffer curve is observed: within a realistic range,
Fig. 5 shows no negative relationship between τ c and tax revenue.22 Across models, the
exogenous public hours in Finn produce a slightly flatter total tax revenue curve as a func-
tion of τ c. In particular, the important difference across the setups is a steeper labor income
tax revenue curve in the union model vs. a flatter labor income tax revenue curve in Finn’s
model. The slope of the labor tax revenue curve is determined by the elasticity of hours with
respect to changes in the tax rate. In both models, a higher τ c decreases the labor wedge,
(1 − τ l)/(1 + τ c). However, the response in hours is larger in the case of the union model,
which features endogenous public sector hours, as compared to Finn’s setup, where ng is held.
After characterizing and comparing the shapes of the Laffer curves in both models, this
section proceeeds to welfare-evaluate the effects of different tax regimes. This is achieved
through several normalized fiscal policy experiments. In all of the experiments, a combina-
tion of tax rate changes will be specified so that total tax revenue is kept constant. The
general usefulness of this approach is that it separates tax and spending issues. In the
framework considered in this paper, however, public sector labor income appears on both
22The reason for this is as follows: In the model parameterizations α > 1, thus the income effect dominates
the substitution effect: when τ c increases, labor supply and capital stock increase while consumption falls.
Note that the increase in private hours and capital, driven by the increase in consumption tax rate does not
translate into an increase in the corresponding tax revenue category. In addition, a higher τ c leads to lower
steady-state consumption, but a higher consumption revenue. As argued in Trabandt and Uhlig (2010), a
consumption tax Laffer curve arises if α < 1, so that after an increase in τ c, the substitution effect dominates
the income effect and hours and capital stock fall together with consumption. In the union model, public
employment also falls, driven by the fall in tax revenue. In the borderline case, when α = 1 (log-utility), the
two effects offset one another. Again, no consumption tax Laffer curve occurs.
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Figure 3: Capital tax Laffer curve
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Figure 4: Labor tax Laffer curve
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Figure 5: Consumption tax Laffer curve
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sides of the government budget constraint. In addition, the substitutability/complementarity
of the capital and labor input in the Cobb-Douglas production function, the substitutability
between consumption and labor, as well as the substitutability between consumption and
investment implies that changes in a single tax rate will affect the tax revenue generated
from the other two tax bases.
Following Lucas (1987), the approach taken is to compute the compensatory variation in
consumption, the percentage of compensating consumption, ζ, that is to be given to the
household to make it indifferent between the two regimes.23 Three different policies will be
examined: a 1% increase in capital income, labor income, and consumption tax rate will
be considered. In order to keep total tax revenue constant, whenever a tax rate increases,
one of the other two tax rates will be allowed to adjust, holding all other model parameters
fixed.24
7.1 Revenue-neutral increase in capital income tax rate
This subsection discusses the steady-state effect of a 1% increase in τ k, with results presented
in Table 5 on the next page. Higher capital income tax rate enters the Euler equation and thus
Table 5: Welfare gains/costs of 1% increase in τ k in Germany
Model τ l fixed, τ c adjusts τ c fixed, τ l adjusts
τ c = 0.4033 ↑ (25.52%) τ c = 0.1481
τ l = 0.4085 τ l = 0.5535 ↑ (14.50%)
Union ζ = −0.2093 ζ = −0.2425
τ c = 0.3657 ↑ (21.76%) τ c = 0.1481
τ l = 0.3596 τ l = 0.5415 ↑ (13.30%)
Finn ζ = −0.1430 ζ = −0.1745
23The initial regime for Germany is as described in Section 2, with the calibration and steady state solution
presented in Section 3. The value of ζ is calculated for all restrictive fiscal policy scenarios, where a positive
(negative) value indicates a welfare gain (loss).
24For example, η and gty in the union model, and gty in Finn, are held fixed at the values obtained in the
original steady-state computation.
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decreases the steady state private capital-to-output ratio. Since total revenue with respect
to τ k is relatively flat in both models, the increase in capital income tax essentially does not
change total revenue. Variations in labor income tax rate, or consumption tax rate, however,
are very distortionary, as they operate through the marginal rate of substitution. A higher
labor-, or a higher consumption tax rate, lower private hours. From the complementarity
of hours and capital in the production function, capital stock also falls. Lower levels of
labor and capital inputs shrink output, which in turn decreases consumption. This change
in steady-state allocation requires additional adjustment in the varying tax rate (τ l or τ c) to
preserve revenue neutrality. The computational experiment performed shows that in either
case, the adjusting tax rate has to change significantly to satisfy the revenue neutrality
restriction. Across models, consumption tax is the less distortive instrument. Additionally,
the computed welfare cost is higher in the union model by 6.63 % (6.8 % when τ l varies)
due to the endogenous response of public hours, which requires significantly larger tax rate
increases in the union model.
7.2 Revenue-neutral increase in labor income tax rate
In this case, an increase in τ l affects the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between steady-
state hours and consumption. As in the previous subsection, the analysis is split into two
sub-cases, with results summarized in Table 6 on the next page. When the consumption tax
Table 6: Welfare gains/costs of 1% increase in τ l in Germany
Model τ k fixed, τ c adjusts τ c fixed, τ k adjusts
τ k = 0.1603 τ k = N/A
τ c = 0.3862 ↑ (23.81%) τ c = 0.1481
Union ζ = −0.2105 ζ = N/A
τ k = 0.1603 τ k = N/A
τ c = 0.35 ↑ (20.19%) τ c = 0.1481
Finn ζ = −0.1444 ζ = N/A
rate is the adjusting rate, a 23.81% increase in τ c is required in the union model. Again,
Finn’s setup generates much smaller welfare cost as compared to the union model, as the
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setup with exogenous public sector hours requires consumption tax rate to increase by 17%
to preserve the initial level of tax revenues.25 In both models, the increase in the consump-
tion tax rate relative to the increase in the labor income tax rate is larger. Therefore, the
labor wedge, (1− τ l)/(1 + τ c), decreases in both cases, which leads to an increase in private
hours. Since hours and private physical capital are complements in the production function,
the increase in labor input raises the marginal product of private capital, hence real interest
rate will increase as well. The higher return to capital encourages investment, and thus
steady-state private capital stock expands. Following the expansion in capital input, out-
put increases as well. In turn, higher output leads to higher consumption. The increase in
consumption, however, is dominated by the increase in hours, so long-run welfare decreases
relative to the one obtained in the initial steady-state. In addition, in the union model, there
is an important feedback effect, which further increases welfare cost. This effect works to in-
crease public hours, as a result of the higher tax revenue. In effect, endogenously-determined
public hours add to the allocative distortions in the union model. Public hours enter the
MRS condition, and thus necessitate a much larger adjustment in the union economy, as
compared to Finn’s framework. The presence of endogenously-determined public hours and
wages adds 6.6% to the computed welfare loss.
In the second sub-case, when capital income tax rate varies in response to the increase
in labor income tax, no reasonable level of τ k (i.e. τ k ∈ [−1, 1]) exists that satisfies the rev-
enue neutrality restriction. This is a straightforward consequence of the relatively flat Laffer
curve with respect to the capital income tax rate, as demonstrated in the section on capital
tax Laffer curve. Additionally, in both models the share of capital income tax revenue is
less than 3%, which is very small when compared to consumption tax revenue share (22%)
and labor income tax revenue share (75%). Thus, capital income tax rate is not a suitable
instrument for fiscal adjustment, due to its limited ability to affect total tax revenue.
7.3 Revenue-neutral increase in consumption tax rate
The increase in τ c affects the marginal rate of substitution between steady-state hours and
consumption as well; hence, the effect on allocations is qualitatively similar to the one de-
25Note that the higher fall in a tax rate results in a lower level of distortions in the economy.
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scribed in the previous section. In the first sub-case of this scenario (Table 7 below), when
the labor income tax rate changes to preserve the tax revenue, it needs to increase by 12.73%
and 16.96% in Finn and the union model, respectively.
Table 7: Welfare gains/costs of 1% increase in τ c in Germany
Model τ k fixed, τ l adjusts τ l fixed, τ k adjusts
τ k = 0.1603 τ k = N/A
τ l = 0.5781 ↑ (16.96%) τ l = 0.4085
Union ζ = −0.2404 ζ = N/A
τ k = 0.1603 τ k = N/A
τ l = 0.5358 ↑ (12.73%) τ l = 0.4085
Finn ζ = −0.1724 ζ = N/A
This upward change in the labor income tax rateis significantly larger than the increase in
consumption tax rate. The resulting decrease in the effective labor wedge, (1− τ l)/(1 + τ c),
affects labor supply and consumption decisions: the household responds to the dominating
income effect and supplies more hours in the private sector. Next, the higher level of labor
input in the production function raises both output and the interest rate. The higher return
to private physical capital leads to an increase in investment, which adds to the capital
stock and expands output. The positive wealth effect then translates into an increase in
consumption. However, the higher consumption is offset by the increase in hours, so welfare
decreases. Additionally, the increase in hours is higher in the union model, driven by the
endogenously-determined public hours, which positively co-move with private hours. Thus
the required increases in labor income tax rates produce nearly 6.8% larger welfare losses in
the union model, a result attributed to the endogenously-determined public hours.
The case when τ k is the adjusting tax rate unravels exactly as the case when τ l increased
by 1% and τ k was the adjusting tax rate. Intuitively, both an increase in τ c and τ l decrease
the effective labor wedge, thus the resulting adjustments through τ k are qualitatively smilar.
Again, there is no feasible capital income tax rate that preserves revenue neutrality.
Overall, the experiments performed in this section uncovered some important limitations
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of Finn’s model with exogenous public hours. The presence of endogenously-determined
public sector hours and wage rate was shown to generate important interactions, which add
to the distortionary effect of taxes. If ignored, the long-run welfare cost of revenue-neutral
tax increase policies could be significantly underestimated.
8 Summary and Conclusions
Motivated by the highly-unionized public sectors, the high public shares in total employment,
and public sector wage premia observed in most post-WWII European economies, this paper
examined the role of public sector unions in a DSGE framework. A strong union, operating
in a largely non-market sector was shown to be relevant for business cycle fluctuations, and
when evaluating the welfare effects of fiscal policy. Following Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al.
(2009), an optimizing public sector union was incorporated in a real business cycle model
with valuable government consumption and productive public investment. The RBC model
generated cyclical behavior in hours and wages that is consistent with data behavior in an
economy with highly-unionized public sector, Germany during the period 1970-2007. Over-
all, the model with collective bargaining in the public sector is an improvement over a similar
model with exogenous public employment, namely Finn (1998). In addition, endogenously-
determined public wage and hours add to the distortionary effect of contractionary tax
reforms and produce greater changes in tax rates to achieve a pre-specified increase in tax
revenue and hence significantly higher welfare losses, as compared to Finn’s model. Thus,
endogenous public hours are quantitatively important model ingredient when evaluating fis-
cal policy. In particular, ignoring the positive co-movement between public and private wage
and hours leads to a significant underestimation of the welfare effect of tax regime changes.
Data sources: Due to data limitations, the model calibrated for Germany will be for the period
1970-2007, while the sub-period 1970-91 covers West Germany only. For Germany, data on real
output per capita, household consumption per capita, gross fixed capital formation per capita, as
well as government consumption and population were taken from the World Development Indicators
(WDI) database. The OECD statistical database was used to extract the long-term interest rate
on 10-year generic bonds, CPI inflation, average annual earnings in the private and public sector,
average hours, private, public and total employment in Germany. Public transfers ratio were cal-
culated from the CES-Ifo DICE Database (2011). Public and private investment and capital stock
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series were obtained from EU Klems database (2009). German average annual real public compen-
sation per employee was estimated by dividing the real government wage bill (OECD 2011) by the
number of public employees. Due to data limitations on the average hours worked in each sector,
employment statistics were used. To make empirical variables comparable with model variables,
employment series in Germany were normalized by total population (obtained from WDI).
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